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The recent institutional and political reforms of the Moroccan local government offer interesting 
sites to investigate the possible articulations between urbanism and the exercise of citizenship in 
the age of globalisation. Through their analysis we can question the nature of power relations and 
competing forms of legitimacy within the city. The new Communal Charter adopted in October 
of 2002 provides a series of reforms which are both deeply grounded in Moroccan urban history 
- and its political stakes in the nation - and greatly inspired by contemporary norms of ‘good 
governance’.ii 
In an introductory part of this chapter I’ll present the national and ideological context in which 
the new reforms of decentralisation are introduced. This will clarify the main issues at stake in 
the idea of decentralisation in Morocco. In a first part I’ll show how the new local charter is 
inscribed in a long history of political relations between the centre and the governance of the 
city. The elements of change introduced by this law do not alter the weight of the control from 
the central power. Secondly, I’ll compare two authoritative local figures and their evolution, the 
Mayor and the Wali in order to question the political resources given by technical competencies 
(combined with the support of the king) and by elective legitimacy. In the last part we’ll see 
nevertheless, through the analysis of the last elections, that the cities, in a context of 
globalisation, remain a political scene where the struggle between representation and technical 
competence are still played out.  
At first, let us examine the context in which the new law was adopted and put into practice. ‘The 
Reform of the Moroccan State’ has been inscribed in the public agenda since the publication in 
October 1995 of reports of the World Bank blaming the system of education, administration, and 
economic strategy of the Kingdom. It specifically targeted its administrative structures. This 
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document, and the declaration of the King following its publicationiii, marked the starting point 
of a series of reformsiv. In terms of administration, a national program on governance was 
developed since 1996 under the co-ordination of the Minister of Economic Planning with support 
from the UNDPv. The formation in April 1998 of a government headed by socialist-party leader 
Abderrahmane Youssoufi accelerated the program’s dynamic. The themes of private and public 
decentralisation evoked in a general manner were the main theme of the 7th national colloquium 
on local communities in 1998. According to reformers and official authorities, they are explicitly 
inscribed in a plan of democratisationvi. They are also promoted by donors who encourage 
decentralisation reforms in Morocco. As the same time of the UNDP program, in November 
2001, USAID financed its own diagnostic study on the ‘local capacity for good governance’. In 
the same year, the French government implemented a ‘Programme d’appui à la decentralisation 
au Maroc’.  
This chapter will show that the ‘decentralisation’, which is at stake in these reforms, concerns 
less the local elected authorities than local institutions whose power is derived from the national 
government. This increases the competition between two kinds of local institutions. Power is 
transferred to the local representatives of the central power, more than to local voters. In 
Moroccan institutional history, largely influenced by the French tradition, the representatives of 
the central power are called ‘déconcentrées’ and the second ones, the elected authorities, 
‘décentralisées’: ‘Decentralisation’ refers here to the transfer of competencies – and resources - 
to local elected authority, while ‘deconcentration’ is the term used to refer to administrative 
decentralisation: the transfer of competencies inside a single state administration, from its 
national level to its local level. This is a central point to understand the logics and paradoxes of 
contemporary reform of city governance in Morocco, especially as regards its outcomes on 
citizenship. 
No Moroccan city can claim to participate in any major way in the control and management of 
the global economy, to go back to the quasi-canonical definition of the ‘global city’ proposed by 
Saskia Sassen.vii It is the large coastal strip that stretches over 250 kilometres around Casablanca 
that best fits this definition. With 20% of the population, the city‘s economic and financial centre 
- its ‘CBD’ (Central Business District) - houses the activities of the “high” service sector.viii The 
city was affected in different manners -positively and negatively- by the reorientation of 
Morocco's political economy, especially the structural adjustment programs put into place in 
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1983 and the integration into a free market economy with the European Union and with the 
United States (initiated by partnership accords signed in 1996 and 2004 respectively). This has 
accelerated Morocco's economic integration in the ‘global market.’  
However, different Moroccan cities partake in a globalisation process that has mostly taken on 
two forms: First, we note the major transformations that the urban fabric is undergoing because 
of economic changes, most notably via the privatisation process, the European off-shoring and 
the opening up of economic borders and customs. This has specifically affected the Moroccan 
labour market, the professional activities of city-dwellers, and the regulations concerning these - 
the number of citizens without work and social welfare increased.ix This contributed also to the 
increase of urban population and the extension of bidonviles (shantytowns) in the periphery of 
big towns. Secondly, Moroccan cities do not escape the wave of reforms carried out more or less 
on a global scale and in the scheme of international development agencies working toward 
‘better urban governance.’ This leitmotif is sufficiently broad to adapt to a variety of measures 
that cover a range of directives that are often inconsistent and that give rise to multiple and 
contradictory discourses. The city is designated as a target for reform without clearly defining its 
areas. ‘The city’ is supposed to show coherence, or at least a degree of autonomy. The 
developing agencies regularly refer to four attributes to define the territory of the ‘ideal’ and 
‘globalised,’ if not ‘global,’ city: ‘competitiveness’ in the global market, ‘liveability and decent 
quality of life’ for the poor, ‘good governance’, and ‘bancability’x. Behind the technical and 
economic jargon, however, lies a political question of power and its sharing. In this sense, it is as 
much the definition of citizenship (and the ability for the inhabitants to take part in the politics of 
the city) as the conditions of its exercise in an urban context that are questioned in relation to 
local leadership and decentralisation. In their actions, the reformers privilege most often safety 
and economic ‘efficiency’ to other concerns and invoke a developmentalist paradigm that has 
shown its limits long ago (‘market now, democracy later’). 
The reforms of the local government were implemented in this context. The Moroccan 
Parliament ratified a new Communal Charter on October 3rd, 2002. This text, which replaced the 
one from 1976, apparently puts the local communities - notably at the municipal level - at the 
centre of a vast plan for territorial administration while the Municipalities have for decades been 
relegated to the margins of both administration and ‘urban development.’ In reality, however, the 
liberalisation of the domestic economy associated with a rapid growth of cities slums has 
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‘economised’ the urban question. The imperative to decentralise economic policies and to 
encourage private investment was reinforced and this deprived Municipalities of many 
competencies. ‘Controlling and developing’xi still remain the main leitmotifs of Moroccan urban 
policies.  
 
If we cannot deny the strategic importance of cities in the making of modern citizens, it remains 
that the urban framework produces social cleavages and forms of modern domination that we 
propose to examine through the prism of the transformation of local governance in Morocco. The 
recent forms of ‘decentralisation’ in Morocco pose questions to models of citizenship that are 
constructed or deconstructed in these urban spaces under profound change. The modalities and 
conditions of participation in public life are inscribed in a triple process: First, 
‘municipalisation’, within the scope of the new Communal Charter, answers more to decisions 
‘from above’ than to grievances ‘from below’. Second, the city that is defined by 
municipalisation is more the ‘urbs’ (the territorial perimeter) than the ‘civita’ (the political 
model). Finally, municipalisation introduces changes of scale. The re-positioning of the political 
centre determines and constrains the ‘municipalisation’ of the city - and the public representation 
of the city-dwellers. They are caught within the game of power among the authorities. 
 
Decentralisation? The rationales of local public action reform 
 
Announcing the emergence of an urban government model centred around the ‘uniqueness’ of 
the city, the new Communal Charter - both strongly supported by the King and ex-opponent 
political parties such as the Union of socialist popular forces (USFP) - shows a reformist will. At 
the outset, it substantially transforms the landscape of the City Councils by fusing the 
Municipalities of the fourteen urban agglomerations of more than 500,000 inhabitants across the 
country. To understand what is at stake with the adoption of the new law, we need to look it 
within the history of decentralisation in Morocco.  
Up until 2002 ‘Moroccan style’ decentralisation – in the strict sense of transferring power to 
local elected assembly – has been divided into four principal levels:  
 
1 - The Local Council (urban or rural, the distinction being set by law)  
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2 - The Urban Community in certain agglomerations that federates the activities of multiple 
urban Municipalities 
3 - The Prefecture or Provincial assembly with limited jurisdiction.  
4 – The Regional Council that only attained local community status in 1996 
 
The jurisdictions of these institutions are variable, and their respective constituencies are limited 
by authorities send by the national government causing overlap, redundancy, or conflict. Caïd, 
Pacha, Governors and Walis are appointed by the King to represent the central administration at 
different levels. Their ‘jurisdiction’ is rarely defined with any precision but as representatives of 
the King (and officials from the minister of Interior) they concentrate more powers and resources 
than the elected authorities. An extreme confusion exists among the multiple jurisdictions that 
plot, share, and trace out the contours of the urban political and administrative landscape. Far 
from appearing like a simple accident in the institutional history of Morocco, this state of 
uncertainty reflects a mode of government founded in large part on imprecise and shifting laws, 
of an arbitrary nature. This is an important tool in the security control of the state.xii It is difficult 
to obtain precise and up-to-date maps reflecting recent changes and maps of the various 
administrative perimeters are often lacking. Local officials sometimes appear to be ignorant of 
the precise definition of their jurisdiction. This reflects a tradition of censorship and withhold of 
information, especially when it's a matter of seeing, in images, the relationship between territory 
and politics, and even more so on an urban scale. 
 
TABLE 1: Local communities in Morocco in 2002, before the reform of the Communal 
Charterxiii 
Local communities Legislative Branch Executive Branch 
Regions (16) Regional council is indirectly 
elected by way of electoral 
college 
The Wali, governor of the 
Province or Prefecture of the 
administrative centre of the 
region appointed by dahirxiv 
Provinces (45) or 
Prefectures (26) 
Provincial or Prefectorial 
Assembly elected by indirect, 
universal suffrage based on 
Governor of the Prefecture or of 
the Province, appointed by the 
King 
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councillors college and the 
professional colleges 
Urban Communities (14) The Urban Community council 
includes the presidents of the 
urban Municipalities in the 
agglomeration, and their vice-
presidents, members by right 
The Wali, who is also in charge 
of overseeing its budget. 
Local Councils (249 
Municipalities and 1298 
rural local councils) 
City Council elected by direct 
universal suffrage 
President of the local council, 
elected by the City Councils 
 
As a supra-municipal community, comprised of presidents and vice-presidents of the urban 
Municipalities making up ‘the city’, the Urban Community was, before the introduction of this 
Communal Charter, responsible for co-ordinating transversal infrastructure projects such as 
highways, electricity, sanitation and sewage systems, trash collection, slaughterhouse 
management, etc. This formula was mostly used throughout the 1990s when, for security 
reasons, the agglomerations were divided into several municipalities. Between 1992 and 2003, 
there were fourteen Urban Communities in Morocco: Casablanca (grouping together 27 
Municipalities), Rabat (5), Sale (5), Fez (5), Marrakech (5), Meknes (6), Skhirate/Temara (2), 
Tangier (3), Oujda (4), Safi (3), Tetouan (2), Agadir (4), Taza (2), and Kenitra (3). Depending on 
the places, the contexts and their principal players, the Urban Communities acquired, over the 
course of the 1990s, a variable degree of influence and importance in the governance of cities. 
For political reasons, the Urban Communities of Rabat and Casablanca were sites of intense 
political competition. But, their jurisdiction concerning community and public services were 
heavily shaken these last few years. With the generalisation of the concession of public utilities 
to private companies, they were partly stripped of their functions.   
The Communal Charter of 2002 thus eliminates the Urban Community Council from the 
institutional architecture. It abandons the formula of cities divided into various Municipalities 
and reinstalls a system of a unified administration by ‘fusing’ the Municipalities. In the case of 
towns of more than 500,000 people this is done through the introduction of elected 
‘arrondissement’xv councils.  
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From twenty-nine urban Municipalities in 2002, the agglomeration of Casablanca forms in 2003 
only one unique Municipality with only one President for the City Council and with sixteen 
arrondissemement councils with limited jurisdiction. It now has only 131 City Councillors 
compared to 1147 in the previous configuration. 
The new Charter redistributes, at the margins of course, the resources and capabilities of the 
various local political institutions, especially in urban areas. This alters a threefold movement 
that has, up until this point, characterised the raison d'être of Moroccan ‘decentralisation’.  
Firstly, since 1976 the institutional reforms concerning the local government have tended toward 
fragmentation and the multiplication of actors, institutions and urban territories. Following the 
violent riots of June 1981, Casablanca grew from one to five Prefectures, which duplicated and 
divided the municipal inter-urban institutions. These Prefectures cut up the territory and interfere 
with the jurisdiction of the Municipalities both spatially and in terms of responsibilities and 
political decisions. This division of Casablanca was also accompanied by other plans for the 
territorial control of the State, such as the completion of an urban highway that had the effect of 
practically slicing the metropolis in two and isolating the working-class neighbourhoods and the 
extensions of the southern periphery. From 1977 to 2002, we can thus count seven different 
territorial configurations in Casablanca.  
 
TABLE 2 - 25 years of urban apportioning in Casablanca (1976 - 2002)xvi 
Years Wilaya of 
greater 
Casa 
Urban 
Community 
Prefectures Municipalit
ies 
Rural Local 
Council 
Total Local 
Councils 
Region 
of greater 
Casa 
Total 
of 
administrati
ve units. 
1976-1981 - 1  5    6 
1981-1985 1 1 5 5    12 
1985-1990 1 1 6 17 6+ 1° 23  31 + AUC 
1990-1992 1 1 7 16 6 22  31 + AUC 
1992-1997 1 1 7 27+ 1* 7 35 1 44 + AUC 
1997-2002 1 1 9 29 6 35 1 47 + AUC + 
IRU 
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Added to this segmentation of the cities’ administrative structures, there were many 
organisations - be they public or private, individual or collective, professional or development 
associations - intervening ad hoc in diverse areas of the cities. Nevertheless, the increase of 
actors involved in urban governance didn’t lead to a dispersion of power but rather to a 
centralisation of decision-making. Almost all of the major decisions affecting urbanism during 
the last decades were made at the Palace. Two actors directly dependent on the Minister of the 
Interior, the Urban Agencies and the Wilaya became more powerful in the 1990s for the former 
and more recently for the latter, reinforcing the central powerxvii.  
Consequently, the Municipalities developed a strict dependence on the Ministry of the Interior 
and under its authority, the General Direction of the Local Communities (GDLC). This is the 
second major tendency that characterises the evolution of the urban government in Morocco, at 
least up until the adoption of the new Communal Charter. The same year that the Communal 
Charter of 1976 was promulgated, Driss Basri arrived at the head of the Ministry of the Interior. 
During his twenty years tenure, he established the politico-administrative network that defined 
the Kingdom's territorial administration. As Minister of the Interior between 1976 and 1999, he 
extended the influence of his ministry and created a web of complex formal and informal 
networks. The GDLC maintained a double supervision of the City Councils both budgetary and 
technical, and juridical. This strongly hindered the participatory and democratic potential of the 
elected Municipalities. 
The local tax system, which mainly dealt with the regulation of licenses, urban taxes and the 
redistribution of TVA fees, depended essentially on the central government's redistribution of 
resources. This deprived the City Councils of any margin of autonomy. The lack of financial 
autonomy gave the local governments little space to negotiate the distribution of power in the 
Moroccan government. Rather than attempting a coup de force, the Local Councils preferred to 
draft their proposals and to plead their case with the Ministry or his local representatives. This 
was possible whenever the local council's board had the jurisdiction, political will, and logistical 
ability to do so. Geographical proximity and political support were often an advantage that 
played for example in the case of Rabat, but this task was clearly more arduous for the more 
modest and remote City Councils. 
Local collectivities were also politically marginalized through the way the elections were 
organised. Local and national elections happened under the supervision of GDLC. Election 
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campaigns and the ballots were moments of mobilisation and designation ‘from below’ of 
members of City Councils as well as ways to control political and civil societies.xviii The means 
of control are plural and complex having evolved throughout the seven local campaigns that 
Morocco underwent since independence, incorporating physical and symbolic violence as well as 
political and economic pressure and cartographic manipulation. The result was that the 
candidates in the election seemed as much (if not more) dependent from their allies, well 
positioned within the leadership of the local communities, as from the choice of voters. 
A third dynamic that intersects that of decentralisation and contributes to the multiplication of 
political actors in the city could be qualified as ‘privatisation of the city.’ On the one hand, non-
public actors in the metamorphosis of urban configurations. This might include land or 
architectural operations or perhaps the indirect effects of economic activities. Urban space thus 
resembles a commercial space to be ‘administered,’ ‘managed,’ or ‘profited from.’ On the other 
hand, non-public or non-institutional actors who find themselves invested with responsibilities of 
‘public services’ through delegation of administration duties or in the frameworks of local 
associations.  
Entire areas of jurisdiction dealing with urban issues are transferred from the Municipalities to 
national or international private groups. Since the move towards privatisation in 1991, big 
international companies such as the ‘Lyonnaise des Eaux’, the Bouygues group and its Moroccan 
subsidiary company Bymaro, or more recently Vivendi in Rabat, Tangier, and Tetouan, have 
invested in urban utilities (here water supply).xix Their intervention-rationales were based on 
their own action plans and their private interests, and do not necessarily contradict public politics 
in terms of development and urbanism. Nevertheless, because they are not formally integrated 
into the larger urban project, their actions could incite conflict over the occupation and use of 
space. Their interventions draw new boundaries within the city, without necessarily taking into 
consideration the distinctions between the ‘legal city’ and the ‘illegal city’ or the legal status of 
space, and without any concern for egalitarianism. The city-dweller, barely the citizen, is first 
and foremost perceived as a ‘client,’ a ‘consumer,’ a beneficiary, or a voluntary member of 
associative action. In essence, the negotiations, discussions, and agreements relating to these 
contracts take place not only in a non-public manner, but also without any real association with 
local elected officials. Until their disappearance, the Urban Communities were, de jure, in charge 
of these kind of utilities, but they did not have, de facto, great latitude to interfere in the terms of 
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the contracts, which were most of the time studied by the Ministry of the Interior, the GDLC, and 
the director of state-owned or private concession companies, and negotiated directly at the 
Palace.  
Nevertheless, in the case of the concession of the state controlled corporation for electricity and 
water supply, the REDAL at Rabat – Salé, the elected City Councillors protested successfully 
against the first agreement signed with a luso-spanish consortium, in the name of the defence of 
citizens interests.xx Furthermore, Lamia Zaki shows that in shanty towns of Casablanca the 
elected officials intervened a posteriori in order to act as mediators between the Lydec society 
(the Lyonnaise des Eaux’ subsidiary for electricity and water supply) and the residents refusing 
to pay their electricity bill.xxi 
In terms of ‘privatising’ the city, it is important to mention the more and more visible 
intervention of local associations that are less present in the urban decision-making process than 
in the various forms of the implementation of public action.xxii The particular dynamism of 
neighbourhood associations participates in new forms of spatial appropriation.xxiii These 
associations are characterised by a great heterogeneity, among cities, among neighbourhoods and 
sometimes at the heart of a single large neighbourhood. The quest for an urban identity seems to 
be in all cases at the centre of the aspirations around which newly arrived individuals organise 
themselves. Despite its youth and its constraints, this urban local association movement was able 
to attain some successes. But it also suffered from a number of problems that limited its added 
value. The first kind of limits lays in the ambiguous attitude of the public powers vis-à-vis these 
neighbourhood associations. They are perceived as a means of compensating for the 
disengagement of state-controlled power and their place in the local government remains 
unpredictable, often rendering their actions transient. Added to this factor is the poverty of the 
material and human means at their disposal. Most of them assume a temporary character. Few 
succeed in equipping themselves with permanent structures. Finally, the omnipresence of the 
state has not disappeared in the popular representations. In the public imagination, the spaces 
outside people's homes are of the public order and are therefore the responsibility of public 
representatives, thus of the Local Councils.  
From the security imperatives of the 1980s to the development imperatives of the 1990s and 
2000s, the role of the Municipalities remains extremely minor. The Palace stays central in the 
initiation and control of urban policies. In this context, the adoption of the new Communal 
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Charter is more part of a broader course of reorganisation of the administrative structures in 
Morocco from above, than it is a response to the grievances of the local democracy. 
 
Local leadership in transformation? 
 
In the previous part we have seen how the new communal charter was implemented in the 
context of a longer history of decentralisation that in fact gave little autonomy to local actors. In 
the following I will show how its implementation intervenes in the exercise of local leadership. 
 
The invention of the ‘Mayor’: a new actor in the city? 
 
The new Communal Charter contributed to the reshaping of the urban political game and thus to 
the relations between city dwellers and their ‘representatives.’ Certain clues seem to point at a 
reinforcement of the power at the heart of the Municipality, and most of all in the hands of the 
president of its City Council.  
On the one hand, the jurisdictions that the Communal Charter of 1976 assigned to the old Urban 
Communities of the fourteen cities are now transferred to the level of the new City Council. 
Thus, if the arrondissements of 2003 lose in power to the detriment of the new ‘Municipality’, 
the latter wins in power, in relation to the former jurisdictions of the Urban Communities. On the 
other hand, the Charter reduces the importance of the supervision of the Ministry of the Interior 
on the City Council only marginally since it modifies neither the principle nor the system. The 
preliminary control of legality is thus reduced to matters determined by the law. The delay within 
which the Minister of Interior has to sign for payment is also fixed. The text provides a 
reinforcement of the jurisdictional control on the acts of the authorities that supervise (control of 
the regional banking courts created by a new law on the control of public finances). Parallel to 
this, general inspectors of the territorial administration have been formed at Kenitra in order to 
‘control’ the governors' actions. But no mission has yet been conferred upon the first promotion. 
In this context of political and technical reinforcement of the municipal jurisdictions, for the first 
time, journalists called the president of the City Council ‘Mayor’ when they were commenting 
on the elections of September 2003, as if a new function appeared in the urban government. The 
new Communal Charter extended the prerogatives of the president of the City Council. Article 7 
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of the 1976 Charter allowed the forced resignation of the president based on a two-thirds vote of 
the council members lead to the dismissal of many presidents between 1999 and 2001 but was 
abolished by the 2002 Charter. What's more, since the new Charter the cessation of the 
president's function automatically leads to the cessation of the board of the City Council. As a 
supplementary privilege, the ‘president of the Local council becomes not only the executive 
authority of the Municipality, but receives, by law, from his majesty the King a dahir that 
provides him with his majesty's high recommendations’xxiv. This is not without importance in 
Morocco and adds to the legitimacy of the ballot the legitimacy of the royal seal.  
The powers of Mayors in terms of police administration are from now on defined. Several 
political parties demand since long that the requisitioning of the public forces when the president 
demands for it becomes obligatory, but this demand remains dead letter. Many elected presidents 
and their councillors feel, therefore, powerless for lack of access to the police. They rely on the 
good will of the Prefecture for the execution of decisions.  
The apparent reinforcement of the powers of Mayors went with a reformulation of the status of 
elected officials.xxv First, the plurality of offices is banned. Second, the elected officials must 
from now on prove to have a level of instruction equal to that of the end of primary schooling. 
This is a response to the criticisms that the locally elected have been subject to for a decade, 
accused of incompetence, corruption, or poor public finance administration.xxvi 
Besides the dispositions that the new Charter introduced, the power of the Mayors became very 
limited due to the conditions of their election in 2003. The 2002 Local Charter introduces a new 
kind of ballot system: in the towns of more than 25000 inhabitants, the proportional 
representation was adopted replacing the previous ‘first-past-the post’ system. In constituencies 
of less than 25000 inhabitants, the first-past-the-post system was maintained.  
Paradoxically, the local elections of 2003 highlighted the feeble political and territorial 
legitimacy of newly elected officials. The rate of abstention continues to rise. If the official 
participation was 75% in the 1997 elections, it dropped to 50% in 2003. In the big cities, the rate 
of participation did not surpass 47%. In the largest agglomerations, the concrete organisation of 
the election of the Mayors was controversial. A series of scandals during the elections 
compromised immediately their legitimacy. Due to both the ballot system and to the number of 
parties in the running (26), there was an extreme dispersion of votes. This explains that the 
designation of the president of the City Council among the councillors led to secret negotiations, 
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treasons and diverse alliances between the leaders and the parties aiming at the presidency of the 
large agglomerations. Because of this game, in the big cities, many candidates without popular 
support who ended up being elected.xxvii  
It remains to be seen to which extend these new legislative and political rules of the game will 
play a role in the municipalisation of the city. The main indications point towards a situation of 
dependence of the Local Councils vis-à-vis the central administration. Nevertheless, because of 
the symbolic and political weight that Municipalities hold by virtue of being the representatives 
of the city and not of the ‘parties of the city’ we could imagine a new configuration of power 
relations in which the president of the City Council plays a more important role. 
 
The Advent of the ‘Techno-Wali’: Relocation of the Control of the Central Government and 
New Models of Leadership 
 
Parallel to this fragile emergence of the ‘Mayor’ in the 2000s, another personality imposed itself 
in the politics of the city, with a technocratic legitimacy and not a representative one. Over the 
past decade, the regional Walis started to speak on behalf of the city and assumed the main 
decision-making on all matters of urban administration and/or policies. Walis are regional 
governors appointed by the King. Even if they hold important executive powers at the local level 
and are appointed by the King, they claim to be politically neutral, an idea strengthened by the 
media. This contributes to the ‘depoliticisation’ of the local political arena.  
Up until the mid 1990s, the Wilaya institution slowly develops, without real legal existence, co-
ordinating the various activities of the urban authorities. The King refers to them for the first 
time in 1981, when, after urban riots, he pointed out that the ‘Wali’, as governor of the main 
Prefecture of the region of Casablanca, had to co-ordinate the action of the various Prefectures 
and Provinces of the region. Alongside this de facto creation of the first Wilaya, it was decided 
to increase the number of Prefectures in this town. The creation of Wilaya was generalised in all 
the regions between 1983 and 1997, a fact that was strongly related to security measures and 
political control of urban population. For instance, after violent riots in December 1990, the 
cities of Fez, Marrakech, and Meknes, were divided into many Prefectures and endowed with a 
supra-prefectorial structure, the Wilaya, in charge of co-ordination. Beyond the co-ordinating 
function, the Walis intervene mostly in terms of safety and especially in serious situations such 
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as after the popular uprisings, as guarantors of the public order at the local level, representatives 
of the Ministry of Interior, in the service of whom they are all recruited. 
Despite the gradual generalisation of the ‘Wali’ title, Moroccan law remained, for more than 
twenty years, silent about both the status and the power of the Walis. They only legally existed 
because of a ministerial decree of 1983 granting Walis power as governors, a decree kept ‘secret’ 
and unpublished in the Buletin oficiel. This decree attributes three missions to the Wali: 
‘maintaining the public order,’ ‘urbanism’ and ‘economic and social development.’  
An important step, when it comes to city governments, is taken in the institutionalisation process 
of the Walis in the early 2000s, still without legal codification. In January 2002, the regional 
Wali finds himself endowed with particular prerogatives in a royal letter about the ‘decentralised 
management of investment’xxviii. This letter conferred them important and new functions: they 
are in charge of the decentralised management of investment and of ‘economic and social 
development.’ In particular, the letter ordained the creation, under their supervision, of Regional 
Investment Centres (RIC), that centralise the services for economic operators, Moroccan or 
foreign, interested in local investment.  
Politically, the role of the Walis was clearly affirmed in the last few years. The royal letter 
followed the departure of the former minister of the Interior, Driss Basri, in September 1999, and 
the nomination of new governors. This brought a new generation to the head of the Wilaya 
whom the media will call ‘Super-Wali’ or ‘Techno-Wali’. On July 27th, 2001, seven out of nine 
Walis appointed are, for the first time, from outside the services of the Ministry of the Interior. 
These are graduates of the best French schools, engineers and often heads of important public or 
private offices in the Kingdom, some of whom having participated in the privatisation program. 
The day after their nomination, the newspaper headlines speculated about the mark these Walis 
would be leaving: ‘A 'dream team' of Walis to shake up the administration,’ ‘Walis' new look,’ 
‘Walis-management,’ ‘private bosses for the public.’ The accent in these expectations and 
collective representations is on their ability to manage the city according to the ‘rules of private 
management’.xxix Keeping in mind the social origins of most of them, they cannot rightly be 
considered outsiders. Nevertheless, like the new minister of the interior, Driss Jettou, they 
embody a new generation of political men, close to the Palace - also often in business-, 
promoting a certain ‘technocratisation’ of the policies and politics of the city.  
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This apparent reversal of the Palace's priorities, through the reform of the Wilaya institution, 
showed its limits in the local election of 2003. The elections were considered arduous for the 
authorities and the Palace. The ‘Islamist’ party of justice and development (PJD) displayed its 
ambitions, after its remarkable scores at the 2002 legislative elections. Its leaders emphasised 
their local and urban electoral base.xxx At that time the so-called ‘Techno-Walis’ were relieved of 
their duties and replaced, except in Marrakech, by individuals from the Ministry of the Interior.  
In general, since 2002, the prerogatives of the Walis increased, in the cities combining security 
and economic imperatives. This economic and security function reduces the possibilities for the 
intervention of several ministers at the city-level through the delegation of ministerial powers, 
and reinforces the territorialisation of the central State.  
Even though the Walis do not have much power in legal terms, the question is whether they will 
cede some of their powers of decision-making to ‘Mayors’. This being, as Manichean as it is, the 
alignment of the fates of the Wali and the Mayor these last few years in Morocco suggests 
conflicts of authority and jurisdiction between these political actors in the city. Far from 
announcing the end of politics, this contributed to a reinvention or a reorientation of the modes 
of political action. 
 
Reinvestment of the Local Arena? The Election Strategies of the PJD 
 
In this last part, I will show, through the examination of the attitude of the Islamist Party of 
Justice and Development (PJD) over the course of the last electoral consultations, how the 
technical argument can go together with representative legitimisation and cannot simply be 
considered as a ‘resurgence of the democratic temptation (...) in face of the inability of the 
political class to fully carrying out its role.’xxxi The PJD appeals to a strategy of the conquest of 
national power (the party remains loyal to the monarchy) through the conquest of local powers.  
In this way the false alternative between a representative legitimacy and a technological 
legitimacy is broken.  
The results of the local elections in 2003, as the Minister of Interior presented them on a national 
scale, are misleading if we don't pay attention to what happened at the level of the city. In terms 
of candidacies, the PJD was absent from 82% of the electoral districts. Therefore, if it appears in 
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11th position on the national level, it reveals itself to be the second electoral force of the 
kingdom in medium sized cities.  
After the bomb attacks in Casablanca, May 16th 2003, the PJD adopted a low profile. Despite 
the protest of the party’s basis, its leaders chose to concentrate its presence in only 18% of 
possible electoral districts and in only half of the arrondissements of the cities with more than 
500,000 inhabitants, where they could effectively expect important victories. None of the main 
party representatives ran in the elections. In general terms, they only supported 3.48% of the 
candidates. This strategy of auto-limitation paradoxically reinforced the PJD’s representative 
legitimacy. They make use of some impressive local victories in the districts where they ran as 
examples to prove their putative electoral force and their efficient and tangible territorial 
inscription in the city. But, the party’s attitude is interesting in many other ways too, especially 
because its leaders as well as its local candidates (re) politicise the urban arena and the 
Municipality. They emphasised a political project based on proximity, associated with urbanity 
and contributed, to the rehabilitation of the Municipal councils. They, therefore, inscribed 
themselves in a legal pattern that uses structures of representation, neglected by other partisan 
groups, to impose themselves on the political field. 
In developing a theory of urban territorial representation, the PJD turns the local administration 
into a politicised arena. The elites and the militants of the party pretend to establish anew the 
municipality at its ‘right’ value and they criticise and condemn what they consider as a ‘misuse’ 
of representative institutionsxxxii. Their elected officials or candidates emphasise furthermore 
their own capacity to control their territory, notably through organising protests. Finally, the 
leaders of the party present their final candidates as spokesmen in terms of ‘trustees’, trustworthy 
representatives, autonomous in their judgements because of their abilities and expertise and not 
influenced by pressures from up or below.  
In addition, in order to conquer the Municipality, these leaders rely on a strategy emphasising 
their capacity to produce information and to master technical projects. Expertise, or at least the 
knowledge, or technical savvy, becomes a weapon or a resource in political competition. In this 
way the discussion is situated in the ‘technical’ domain to avoid a political conflict, but at the 
same time the technical confrontation takes a decidedly more political turn. The party assert to 
prepare a diagnostic for each city where it has elected representatives and its deputies in the 
parliament fought particularly hard for the reform of the Communal Charter as a priority matter. 
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Its leaders disqualified their political opponents, locally elected officials, or decentralised 
authorities by questioning their abilities. Commenting on the new text of the law, a municipal 
councillor from the PJD in Fez affirms: ‘the text demands that the president of the municipality 
has a certain level of education. But this isn't convincing, because what is asked for is simply an 
elementary school certificate! The expectation would have to be raised to a Bachelor's degree or 
more. Among the obstacles [to commune politics] there is the ignorance of the elected officials. 
It's a big obstacle.’xxxiii  
Their ‘technocratic’ or ‘technical’ partners sometimes share this feeling. The governor of the 
urban agencyxxxiv in Fez affirms, on the eve of the adoption of the new Communal Charter: ‘For 
city planning: there too the Municipalities have an essential role to play. They deliver the 
building authorisations. But in practice, we do all the work and they who receive the payment. 
They are the ones who spend the taxes. We are a public services organisation. We sell public 
services: ideas and documents. But for free.’xxxv He insists that his skills, and those of his 
colleagues, are just the opposite: ‘There is a bit of everything: architects, engineers... but mostly 
architects. (…) It's a big advantage, the weight of competence, when you speak. It's not like 
those who let other people do the talking.’  
This competition among the urban political actors, whose jurisdictions are blurred and mixed, 
illustrates the importance of asserting their abilities, or contesting the validity of others' abilities. 
The PJD depute from Fez cited above is an economics professor and defies the ‘Techno-Walis’ 
in this field: ‘The Wali have a lot of other things going on. The logic of development must come 
from investment. Its agents are not made for this, though. They should concentrate on security 
issues. There's a new vision: the ‘manager’... But it's just for show: Who’s going to handle the 
files?’  
The PJD is far from being the only political group to be interested in urban affairs. The parties 
from the ‘national movement’, mainly USFP and Istiqlal, have since long claimed to be 
representative of the cities’ inhabitants and to have competence in its governance. Furthermore, 
many candidates and local officials are strongly anchored in the territoriality of their action. 
What is remarkable about these last elections is the strategy ostensibly displayed by the PJD, 
leading to a reconsideration of the political arena in big Moroccan cities. This is clearly different 
from the schema of a local political arena emptied of its politics and solely in the hands of 
technicians. The idea that the PJD produces a modernisation of the modes of urban governance is 
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exemplary expressed in an article of the French speaking magazine Jeune Afrique l’Inteligent 
about the PJD mayor of Meknes: ‘The administrative structure of Meknes has been rationalised. 
The four Municipalities were grouped into one, which has improved its efficiency by simplifying 
procedures. And already the residents are benefiting: The creation of one office that deals with 
building permits (“a first!”) has added to the drastic reduction of the delays for permits from 
“several weeks to sometime less than 24 hours”. This certainly plays its role in the real estate 
boom that the city is experiencing. (...) In all domains, the Belkora team has adopted a ‘quality 
measure’ that conforms to the ISO 9001 (sic.) adopting management indicators and personnel 
training. (...)’xxxvi 
 
Conclusion 
 
Contemporary transformations of urban leadership in Morocco can lead to two avenues that 
certainly merit further thought and investigation: 
First, we need to underline the extreme fragmentation of legitimate territories in the city. There 
are constituencies for campaign elections; there are the territories of the Prefecture and of the 
Wilaya that extends in theory far beyond that of the Municipality; there is the field of far more 
localised associations such as the domains of the companies providing electricity or water, trash 
collection or reliable transportation. This complexity of territories interferes with the exercise of 
citizenship. The city is, on the one hand, a space for mobilisation, and protest, where power is 
fought for, but the struggles for power also play on the level of policy making as I showed in this 
analysis of the processes of municipalisation. 
Second, in the Moroccan cities, the relations between political actor and public action are 
undergoing a transformation. The decentralisation process and the inherent institutional and 
political rationales affect on the one hand, the strategies adopted by groups and individuals who 
exercising or claiming power and, on the other, the tools and rationales for public action. The 
weight of the centralisation and the lack of public resources limit the political competition and 
the extent of public action.  
The ‘technocratisation’ of the local elite is part of a long and well-studied history of the 
domestication and diffusing of dissent, after the expression of Mohammed Tozy.xxxvii This tends 
to partially neutralise the political game, by weakening the elected officials and by diminishing 
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the scope of representative legitimacy. Nevertheless, local leadership cannot be totally removed 
from urban representation. We saw this with the appointments and the dismissals of the ‘Techno-
Walis’ and with the electoral success of the PJD. This forces us to reconsider the link between 
politics and policies and to question the relation between what happens on a local scale and what 
happens on a national scale. The weight of centralist history in the deployment of the local 
Moroccan communities remains a determining factor in terms of the relation between citizenship 
and urbanity but the political arena of the globalised city can not be considered as emptied of 
politics and solely in the hands of policy makers.  
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